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INTRODUCTION
This Article revives and defends a largely discredited history of
professionalism. It argues that the rhetoric of the professions at the
turn of the twentieth century provided immigrants, minorities,
women, and outsiders of all sorts with an imagined route to
citizenship. This rhetoric combined with the partially open doors of
the profession helped people to move from the periphery to the
center. It helped newcomers, who were viewed as at best irrelevant
and at worst a burden on America, to transcend their role as outsiders
and see themselves as architects of a new and just social order. It also
provided a way for women and minorities to translate their
experience on the periphery into a new vision for the American
polity. Professionalism, in other words, served an important function.
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; Ph.D. University of Chicago;
J.D. Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Elizabeth Chambliss, Doni Gewirtzman,
Bruce Green, James Grimmelman, Molly Land, Ed Purcell, and Ruti Teitel for their
comments on this Article. The Article also benefited from the thoughtful response of
the participants in the Fordham Law School Conference, The Law: Business oi
Profession? The Contnuing Relevance of Julus Henry Cohen for Law Practice in
the Twenty-First Century.
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It provided a growingly diverse and intensely divided country with an
arena in which to negotiate these differences and translate them into
a common language.
For years, historians and sociologists have reminded us of just how
harmful professionalism can be. They have ably and powerfully
documented the abuses committed in the name of the professional
ideal. But relatively few in recent years have uncovered or even
recognized professionalism's more beneficial side.! This Article seeks
to correct that distortion. In doing so, it begins what will hopefully be
an ongoing effort to use history to identify aspects of profession and
the rhetoric that accompanies it that are worth preserving.
Professionalism is such an elastic concept that it can and has served
many different purposes over the years. Some of those purposes have
been pernicious-the rhetoric of the professions has, for example,
been used to justify the exclusion of newcomers of all sorts,
particularly ethnic and racial minorities and women.2 It has been
used to create hierarchies within the profession and reinforce
unjustified monopolies. But other purposes have been more benign.
Professionalism, for instance, has also served as a repository for a
certain version of the American Dream." It has stood for the ability
of individuals on the outskirts to make their way, in one generation at
most, to the inner circles of American society.! The imagined role of
professions was itself useful to those who fought to achieve status
through professional advancement. Not only did it provide
motivation, it also supplied meaning for their pursuit.
1. Robert Gordon and William Simon are a notable exception. See Robert W.
Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS'
IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRAcrICEs: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION 230 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS'
IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACrICEs]. Bradley Wendel has also defended professionalism,
although his concept of professionalism is a bit more specifically defined than the
common use of the term. See W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation,
99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1167,1168-76 (2006).
2. See Mark Galanter & Thomas Paley, The Transformation of the Big Law
Phim, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 31, 39.
3. See Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal
Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note
1, at 144, 148-49.
4. See Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionahsm: The
Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRAcrICEs, supra note 1, at 177.
5. See id.
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So, this Article argues, professionalism did not simply serve as a
way to consolidate the power of a new middle class elite. It did not
grow, as the sociologist Andrew Abbott has suggested, solely from a
monopolistic impulse-a way to lay claim to a jurisdiction and protect
against the intrusion of other professions and occupations. It was
not, as Jerold Auerbach has suggested, purely a product of the
elitism, greed, and xenophobia of a particular social and economic
class.' Nor was it only a cultural process by which an emerging
middle class defined itself and consolidated its power.8 Of course,
exclusion and elitism were a big part of the story, but they were not
the only part. The blend of elitism and egalitarianism in the rhetoric
of the professions allowed for a greater emphasis on the latter. As
such, immigrants, women, and other ethnic minorities could use the
rhetoric of professionalism for their own purposes.
After unearthing this more benign history of professionalism, this
Article argues that this turn-of-the-twentieth-century version of
professionalism is still relevant and desirable today. The professions
still serve as a receptacle for a version of the American Dream. The
rhetoric of the professions can still offer a mechanism for those who
have lived, for whatever reason, at the edges of society to imagine
their way in. It can still provide a way for outsiders to translate their
individual experiences into a common language that can change and
benefit the country as a whole.
Professionalism, like theories that enjoyed popularity at the end of
the last century, was general-a system of thought, in which ethnic
and religious difference did not matter.! What mattered instead was a
combination of intellect and moral fiber."o Professionalism posited a
system of merit in a world in which merit alone could not buy
6. See ANDREW ABBOTr, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE
DIVISION OF EXPERT LABOR 5,15-16 (1988).
7. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 88, 92, 99-102 (1976).
8. See BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM: THE MIDDLE
CLASS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA 31-39 (1946);
SAMUEL P. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM: 1885-1914, at 74, 84 (1957);
ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 111-33 (1967); see also
BRUCE A. KIMBALL, THE "TRUE PROFESSIONAL IDEAL" IN AMERICA, A HISTORY
198-300 (1981) (arguing that professionalism emerged not as a necessary part of
industrialization but as a product of the late nineteenth century obsession with
science); DOROTHY Ross, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 35
(1991).
9. See WIEBE, supra note 8, at 141.
10. See id.
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success.n Overt prejudice and networks of Anglo-Saxon white male
power ensured that access to the professions only got you so far.12
But professionalism-the idea of the unique role of professions in the
polity-imagined away this reality. It envisioned a world in which the
professions-open to all who possessed the intellect and moral
worth-provided a theoretical key to membership not just in those
wood-paneled legal clubs but also in the nation as a whole. Law, in
theory, required its practitioners to both create and support the flesh
and bones of the American system. By practicing the law and
preserving its integrity, attorneys proved not only their allegiance to
the American system but also their centrality to it. How better to
earn acceptance than to catapult from the periphery to the center?
The mechanism was not exactly a professional degree. It was a
degree coupled with rhetoric about what that degree meant.
As we face a massive change in the nature of the legal profession in
the years to come, exploring the history of professionalism is,
perhaps, more important than ever. As we experience rapid and
intense shifts in the economics of the profession, our understanding of
the professions and their proper role in society will certainly change.
It is, this Article argues, important to retain some version of the
professional ideal because it has been and can be useful. But we must
also remain thoughtful and critical about it at the same time. We
ought to work to preserve the useful purposes of professionalism
while shedding the antiquated and destructive ones. It is worth
building on and developing the profession in light of its (good) ideals
and revisiting and discarding the relics of its more destructive
purposes. By exploring the role that professionalism has played, we
are better equipped to preserve and perpetuate the good things about
it, while discarding its outdated or destructive elements.
For decades, scholars have observed that the legal profession has
become increasingly segmented." There are services for the rich and
those for the poor. There are lawyers for fancy corporate clients and
lawyers for individuals. There are bespoke services and commodified
ones. 14  Recently, this observation has come in vogue. Some
11. See Christine Parker & Tanina Rostain, Law Firms, Global Capital, and the
Sociological Imagination, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2347, 2356-58 (2012) (summarizing
the functionalist approach to the professions).
12. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
39-42 (2002).
13. See Andy Boon et al., Postmodern Professions? The Fragmentation of Legal
Education and the LegalProfession, 32 J.L. & Soc'Y 473,486 (2005).
14. Seeid at 481-82.
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journalists and legal theorists have criticized law schools, in part, for
failing to recognize this divide." Critics, such as Brian Tamanaha,
suggest that law schools ought to track the market and cater their
education to the likely careers of their graduates." Personal injury
lawyers, they say, do not need fancy theory. They don't need classes
in jurisprudence or even professors who dabble in that esoteric
world.17 This Article serves as a reminder that the idea and rhetoric
of a unified profession (while never really accurate) has been useful."s
It has provided a way for those on the outside of our society to
imagine a way in. Segmentation poses a threat to that. In envisioning
both the nature of the profession and education, we should bear this
in mind.
Part I of this Article provides some background on the history of
the professions and recounts how historians and sociologists have
analyzed the role of the professions and the rhetoric of
professionalism in American history. Part II explores the life and
work of Julius Henry Cohen, a prominent Jewish lawyer who wrote
about the profession in the early decades of the twentieth century.
Cohen's musings on the profession as well as his life and work as a
lawyer illustrate the historical point that minorities have used the
rhetoric of the professions to imagine their own ascent to leadership.
Cohen helped develop a discourse of professionalism to transcend
the crippling particularity of his circumstances and define a route to
citizenship in somewhat hostile territory. In his book, The Law:
Business or Profession ? Julius Henry Cohen used and developed this
rhetoric of inclusion to create a brand of professionalism that not only
accepted him but in some way needed him." Cohen, a Jew and an
immigrant living in turn-of-the-century New York, used
professionalism to carve out a position for himself (and other
15. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS 167-83 (2012).
16. See id. at 174.
17. See id. at 172-74.
18. The rhetoric of a unified profession was never accurate and, as David Wilkins
has pointed out, has led the bar to resist the increasingly specialized and contextual
nature of legal work. See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating
Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1209, 1217-18 (1993). While I
advocate the idea of a unified profession in this Article, I agree that the bar needs to
abandon that notion for the purposes of ethics and write rules that acknowledge the
different types of work that lawyers do. See Rebecca Roiphe, The Ethics of Willful
Ignorance, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 187,207 (2010).
19. See JULIUS HENRY COHEN, THE LAW: BUSINESS OR PROFESSION? 242 (1916).
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outsiders) in America.' He used professionalism strategically to
blanch out difference and imagine a national identity for himself in a
world that still discriminated against him because of his religion.21
Once he achieved a certain status in the profession, Cohen did not
abandon his experience as an outsider. 2  He associated poor ethical
conduct within the profession not with ethnic identity but with a lack
of education or merit.' By doing so, he used the rhetoric of the
professions to proclaim the potential for human transformation. He
used professionalism to argue and fight for the removal of permanent
barriers to admission and success. In the same breath, he drew on the
rhetoric of the professions to replace fixed barriers to success with
contingent categories that individuals of whatever creed could
transcend with hard work, dedication, and a strong moral sense?
The Article concludes that Cohen was not simply an antiquated
product of a hegemonic vision of America as a melting pot, in which
difference gradually disappeared and made way for the Anglo-Saxon
ideal. The idea of a unified profession can continue to serve a critical
and beneficial purpose in the American imagination. In a country
that has tasted the value of multiculturalism-a world that (mostly)
respects rather than despises difference-there is a way of preserving
the legal profession as a means of social integration without adopting
the cultural hegemony of Cohen's era or the arrogance of the melting
pot ideal. To make this argument, Part III briefly reviews the
political science literature on assimilation and multiculturalism. The
historical attack on professionalism in the 1970s and 1980s captured a
contemporary political attack on the idea of assimilation.' It
reflected a new liberal ideal, which embraced multiculturalism and
pluralism. Since then, political scientists have modified their
understanding of multiculturalism, arguing that it is still possible to
celebrate diversity without abandoning the search for shared values.27
This section of the Article seeks to bring this more nuanced
20. For a detailed analysis of Cohen's life and work, see Samuel J. Levine,
Rediscovenng Jubus Henry Cohen and the Ongins of the Business/Profession
Dichotomy: A Study in the Discourse of Early Twentieth Century Legal
Professionahsm, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 11-13 (2005).
21. See infra Part II.
22. SeeinfraPart II.
23. SeeinfraPart II.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 230-39 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 243-56 and accompanying text.
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commitment to the multicultural ideal back into the debate over
professionalism. This Article concludes that the professions can play
a critical part in a world which respects difference but seeks and
embraces substantive common values at the same time. The legal
profession, in particular, can play an important role in negotiating and
translating values in a heterogeneous world and working toward this
set of shared goals.
Cohen's story offers a cautionary tale. Without grasping onto
outdated entry requirements and rules that create unfair monopolies,
lawyers should try to define core skills and values that form the
essence of the profession and preserve those values as the profession
goes through what seem like fairly convulsive changes. One of those
values is the coherence of the profession, the notion that lawyers
engaged in all different sorts of work share a common pursuit-that
they all in some way seek to improve their community-whether it is
local, national, international, or even virtual.
I. THE PROFESSIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. A Short History of the Professions in America
I am writing an Article about professionalism rather than the
professions. In other words, I am using Julius Henry Cohen to help
understand the role the idea of the professions played in the
American imagination. To do that, however, it is helpful to briefly
sketch the history of the American professions and the rhetoric
surrounding them. It is impossible, of course, to untangle one from
the other.
At the time of the founding, lawyers enjoyed an exalted role.' The
idea of law as a public profession thrived. A tradition of
"republicanism" gave lawyers a sense of public purpose.29 They were,
as Tocqueville later explained, an American substitute for the
28. See Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer-A Brief Informal Hstory of a
Myth with Some Basis in Realty, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1169, 1183-84 (2009)
[hereinafter Gordon, Citizen Lawyei.
29. See id. at 1200; Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L.
REv. 1, 14 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, Independence]; Russell G. Pearce,
Rediscovering the Republican Ongins of the Legal Ethics Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 241, 241 (1992) [hereinafter Pearce, Rediscovering]; Russell G. Pearce, The
Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Pubhi Philosophy, Jurisprudence,
andLegalEthics, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1339,1346-50 (2006).
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aristocracy."0 Lawyers were to defend the legal system from the
inevitable incursions by executive tyrants, populist mobs, or factions
of economic or social interests." They would recommend reform in
the law to strengthen it against attack.32 They would ensure that the
law adapted to the changing landscape before opportunistic groups
took advantage of the lag. Lawyers were particularly suited to this
high calling at the time. They were statesmen and scholars,
gentlemen adept at oratory and part of an educated literary class.'
This group of elite lawyers would, in theory, help the people preserve
and fulfill their own customs and values. At the time, professionalism
mandated that only lawyers possessed the talent to read the common
law and dictate how men should behave toward one another and the
community as a whole. As the historian Robert Gordon has
explained, "the legal elite was to help the People guard their
collective customary wisdom and realize their historical destiny as
Americans.""
The early nineteenth century posed a challenge to this paternalistic
understanding of the lawyer's role. In the general democratizing zeal
of the Jacksonian period, lawyers were easy targets." Radical
democrats sought to reform the law and make it accessible to all."
They hoped that doing so would minimize the need for a legal
profession." It would reduce the status of lawyers as a special class
with unique responsibilities to preserve the legal system and promote
justice." Politicians and reformers insisted that just about anyone
with natural gifts and ambition could practice law.' As this view grew
30. See Gordon, Citizen Lawyer, supra note 28, at 1183-84 (citing ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Henry Reeve trans., Arlington House
Press 1966) (1835) ("[M]embers of the legal profession . . . constitute the only
aristocratic body which can check the irregularities of the people.")).
31. See Gordon, Independence, supra note 29, at 14.
32. See id. at 17.
33. Seeid. at 13-14; see also Pearce, Rediscovering, supra note 29, at 242.
34. See Gordon, Independence, supra note 29, at 32.
35. Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of
American Enterpise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN
AMERICA 70,84 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) [hereinafter Gordon, Legal Thought].
36. See Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 35, at 83-86; Aziz Rana, Statesman or
Scnbe? Legal Independence and the Problem of Democratic Citizenship, 77
FORDHAM L. REv. 1665,1694-1700 (2009).
37. See Rana, supra note 36, at 1695-96.
38. Seeid.
39. See Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 35, at 83.
40. Seeid.
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to dominate, the British classes of solicitors and barristers were
eliminated.4 1 Bar associations and clubs were dismantled.42 Entry
requirements were stripped away,43 and lawyers' political power
subsided for a time."
The Civil War posed a crisis to traditional understandings of
professionalism.45 As Norman Spaulding has elegantly explained:
Elite lawyers active in the professionalization movement of the
Gilded Age kept looking for social stages on which to enact the role
of Tocqueville's lawyer-aristocrats. But the social stages they sought
out were different, more humble, than the stage implied by the
strongest version of antebellum professional ideals. . . . [T]he
profession retreated to organizational structures that provided
collective, less directly political, venues in which to secure
professional authority."
The legal elite still envisioned itself as a leading force in society,
but Spaulding argues that it shifted focus from direct political
engagement to supplying scientific expert knowledge to government
and business.47
After the Civil War, the rapid expansion of the market and the
growth of big cities rendered interactions impersonal and
unpredictable." Networks of trusted friends and business partners
gave way to anonymous corporate interactions. 49 The anonymity was
accompanied by what at the time seemed an alarming stratification.'
Progressive era reformers sought to bring not only order and
41. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERs 40 (1989).
42. See id. at 45-48.
43. See id. at 40-41.
44. See J. WILLARD HURST, THE GRoWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS
298 (1950). For my purposes, I will focus on the late-nineteenth century to the
present, the period in which the professions in general and the legal profession in
particular gained national prominence.
45. See KIMBALL, supra note 8, at 201.
46. Norman W. Spaulding, The Discourse of Law in Time of War.* Politics and
Professionalism During the Civil War and Reconstruction, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv.
2001, 2094 (2005) (internal quotations omitted). Spaulding argues that the legal
profession experienced a crisis in legitimacy as the law degenerated into a political
battle over secession. He argues that the profession retreated during Reconstruction
into a fairly conservative consensus about the meaning of federalism in order to
restore professional status. Id.
47. See id. at 2095.
48. See id. at 2096; see KIMBALL, supra note 8, at 200.
49. See WIEBE, supra note 8, at 81.
50. See generally STEVEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
ExPANsION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982).
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efficiency but also morality to the growingly diffuse and diverse
national community." Against this backdrop, lawyers grew to
national prominence once more. The need for a special class to
mediate the interests of the wealthy and the poor, the government
and its citizens, gained renewed urgency." Thriving off of the late-
nineteenth century fascination with science and expertise, national
organizations grew to protect and promote the interests of lawyers.s"
Unlike the Whig predecessors, the legal elite justified its special role
in society not as a product of lawyers' position as statesmen, not as a
result of their superior knowledge of the common law, but rather as a
result of the ability to refine liberal legal science and engage in the
expert management of public affairs.'
The shift in rhetoric may be due in part to the crisis in the Civil
War, as Norman Spaulding argues." But it seems likely also to have
shifted as a result of the changes in lawyers' work. Just as lawyers
experienced this renaissance, their daily work was changing
significantly. The great trial lawyers and orators of the nineteenth
century were gradually being replaced by business experts who spent
more time practicing in offices than advocating in courts. Experts
with specialized knowledge about the growing needs of business were
gradually replacing the nineteenth century generalists who argued in
the same breath for clients and legal reform." This new zenith in
professional power and prestige was accompanied by the decline of
professional independence.' The web of government agencies and
51. See Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, 10 REVs. AM. HIST. 113
(1982). In his book on the emergence of the American Social Science Association,
Haskell argues that the growth of the professions was a response to a general shift in
understanding of human motivation. The growing interdependence of society, he
argues, led to a crisis in conventional understandings about human motivation, will,
and causality. See THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL
SCIENCE 234-56 (1977).
52. See BLEDSTEIN, supra note 8, at 80-92.
53. See id. at 84-87.
54. See Gordon, Legal Thought, supra note 35, at 97.
55. See Spaulding, supra note 46, at 2012-19.
56. See id. at 2010-11.
57. See Robert W. Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law"- Fantasies and
Practices of New York Oty Lawyers, 18701910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS:
LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 60 (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984)
[hereinafter Gordon, The Ideal and the Actua|.
58. See id.
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the increasingly powerful nature of corporate clients encroached on
lawyers' control over their life and work."
In the late nineteenth century, most lawyers worked as solo
practitioners.' They gained expertise and entrance to the profession
through apprenticeships.' In the early years of the twentieth century,
the bar began to impose educational requirements.62 It started to
restrict entry to the profession to citizens.' As Chair of the New
York County Lawyers Association (NYCLA) Committee on the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, Cohen himself was a part of the
movement to define a distinct and protected area of practice for
lawyers.' Along with other elite members of the profession, he urged
the various bar associations to exclude bar corporations and laymen
from practicing law."
In addition to educational requirements and entry restrictions, the
legal profession sought to regulate its own conduct.' In the name of
preserving independence, the bar drafted the Canons of Professional
Ethics, which were soon adopted by most states.67 In doing so, the
legal elite created rules against solicitation, advertising, and
contingent fees that made it harder for solo practitioners in
metropolitan areas to subsist.' It developed a division between the
elite of the profession and everybody else by setting up rules that
were almost impossible for most lawyers, particularly those practicing
alone in urban areas, to follow. 69 The growth in tort litigation that
accompanied the expansion of factories and railroads also contributed
to the divide between lawyers for corporations and lawyers for
individuals."o It too led to a drive to reform and limit the scope and
power of plaintiffs' attorneys."
59. See Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the
Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1931,1948-49 (2008).
60. See ABEL, supra note 41, at 11.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 12.
64. See Reducing Litigation: Movement of New York County Lawyers'
Association Against Legal Quacks, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1922.
65. See id.
66. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 40-73.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 43-48.
69. See id.
70. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 29-31, 349-50.
71. See id.
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At the turn of the twentieth century, the legal profession secured
its national identity as an elite group with political, economic, and
social power once again. Lawyers, it seemed, would control not only
the application of the law but also its creation and its meaning.'
From the very moment of its greatest power and prestige, the bar
experienced pressure to open its doors to newer members of society."
The expanding, heterogeneous, urban culture seemed to be knocking
at the door of inherited privilege.
But the powerful elite did not give in so easily.' After World War
II, the professions, like many other arenas of American society, felt
the push for inclusion and democratic egalitarianism. More diverse
people had access to higher education and were pursuing law
degrees. The bar had an increasingly hard time keeping them out.'
Thus, the Whig-Federalist rhetoric of exclusion and the Jacksonian
critique seemed to coexist in an uneasy balance.
Few historians have explored the period following the early
consolidation of the legal profession. Rayman Solomon.argues that
the concept of professionalism and its sense of perpetual crisis
remained fairly constant up until the 1960s." The bar raised familiar
cries against the unauthorized practice of law, solicitation, and
advertising.' Leaders among the bar demanded a greater
independence from market forces, independence from client
demands, autonomy from the partisan politics, and dedication to the
public." Historical events such as prohibition, the Great Depression,
President Roosevelt's court-packing plan, and McCarthyism posed a
challenge to the ideals of the profession and produced a renewed call
for lawyers to commit to bringing the values of the profession into
practice.'
72. See Gerald W. Gawalt, Introduction to THE NEw HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN
POST CIVIL-WAR AMERICA vii-viii (Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984).
73. See id.
74. See id. at viii; see also AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 23-28.
75. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 23-28; MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM
PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY
BAR ASSOCIATION xvii (1988).
76. See POWELL, supra note 75, at xvii.
77. See id.
78. See Samuel Haber, The Professions, in II ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
SOCIAL HISTORY 1573, 1582 (Mary K. Cayton et al. eds., 1993).
79. See Solomon, supra note 3, at 144-45.
80. See id. at 151.
81. See id. at 152-53.
82. See id. at 154-68.
44 [ Vol. XL
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As the profession worked its way into contemporary times, the
corporate bar seemed to have drifted further from the service ideal.
The structure of law firms has made it difficult for informal networks
to enforce social norms.' Corporate lawyers abandoned the long-
range social interest of the corporate client in favor of immediate
benefits.' Perhaps, as some have argued, the public service ideal has
not been lost but rather migrated to more specialized areas of
practice.'
The practice of law has grown increasingly diverse and knowledge
increasingly specialized.' Globalization and new technology have
driven lawyers to compete more wildly for clients.' These forces
have, among other things, contributed to increasingly stark
segmentation in the profession-between bespoke and commodified
services, services for global law firms and those for individuals.'
These trends threaten the concept of professionalism. It is hard to
identify one profession when the practice of law looks so different
depending on the area of practice. The segmentation of the
profession, too, threatens to create a permanent divide that
challenges the notion of professionalism.
B. The Professions and Professionalism: A Historiography
Historians have long debated the ascent of the professions in the
late nineteenth century (and the rhetoric surrounding it). In the years
after World War II, liberal thinkers tended to celebrate the
professions along with expertise in general and the source of both
material and social progress.' According to Talcott Parsons, the
83. See MILTON C. REGAN, EAT WHAT You KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET
LAWYER 37 (2004); see also Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic
Tournament: A Second Transformation of the Big Law Fim, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867,
1867-76 (2008).
84. See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role forLawyers?: The Corporate Counselor
AfterEnron, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 1185,1209-10 (2003).
85. See Gordon, Independence, supra note 29, at 65-68.
86. For overviews of this trend, see Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in
LOOKING BACK AT LAW'S CENTURY 287, 289-94 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002) and
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 190-93
(1999).
87. See Elizabeth Chambliss, Two Questions for Law Schools About the Future
Boundaries of the Legal Profession, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 329,339-50 (2012).
88. See id. at 339.
89. See generally HURST, supra note 44; TALCOTr PARSONS, ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (1954).
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professions were the most critical component of modern society.'
Increasingly effective and important, professionals were essentially
apolitical experts seeking to coordinate the country's progress." They
served a function by providing, as Emile Durkheim argued, a solution
to the woes of modern society.2 Dedicated to the good of all,
professionals could moderate the effect of so many egoistic selfish
impulses.' Parsons explained professional ethics (and particularly the
monopoly control over the profession) as a necessary part of the
profession's function as a fiduciary.' Clients, according to Parsons,
were unable to assess the quality of lawyers' expert services."
Professional ethics and monopoly restrictions were necessary to
ensure that lawyers are serving their fiduciary responsibility to clients.
Ever since, generations of historians and sociologists have criticized
this argument, demonstrating the problems inherent in professional
authority and the ideological role the professions play. In the 1960s
and 1970s, neo-Marxist scholars argued that the professions in
general, and the legal profession in particular, emerged in the late-
nineteenth century as an organized force because lawyers were useful
in consolidating the power of industrial capitalists.' Professional
ethics served more as a source of social control than anything else.9
Corporate capitalists needed to frame their own economic interests in
the legitimating language of the law, and the legal profession leant its
expertise and the badge of both respectability and selflessness to the
capitalists' uniquely selfish endeavor.98  Weberian sociologists
similarly viewed the ideology of the professions with skepticism,
90. See PARSONS, supra note 89, at 34,270.
91. See Gerald L. Geison, Introduction to PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, supra note 35, at 3 (citing Talcott Parsons, Professions, in
12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 545 (David Sills ed.,
1968)).
92. See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 10-14
(Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1958).
93. See id.
94. See PARSONS, supra note 89, at 381.
95. See id. at 372-80.
96. See generally JEFFREY L. BERLANT, PROFESSIONS AND MONOPOLY (1975);
MARGALI S. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1977); see also John A. Matzko, "The Best Men of the Bar"* The Founding of the
American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 57, at 75 (arguing
that the American Bar Association was founded by an elite that was anxious about its
status given the growing power of immigrants, corporate clients, and other
professions).
97. See Matzko, supra note 96, at 78-80.
98. See id.
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arguing that the legal profession rhetorically wedded its special
knowledge and expertise to the pursuit of justice as a way to justify its
social ascent." They interpreted the rise of the professions as part of
a class quest for both social status and wealth.'0o
These historians of the legal profession have chronicled how
leaders of the bar pushed to limit admission and prevent external
regulation. Monopoly control was not, as functionalists like Parsons
had argued, a benign way to ensure quality in the profession but
rather a sinister cog in the mechanism of social control.'o' In the early
twentieth century, lawyers sought to secure their ranks and reinforce
the exclusivity of their club by locking the door to newcomers,
especially those with a different race, ethnicity, or gender." To do
so, this elite had to control the educational institutions, the licensing
bodies, certifying agencies, and regulatory bodies." By controlling
bar associations, elite lawyers were able to make it harder for the new
class to intrude. These lawyers wrote rules against contingency fees,
advertising, and solicitation.'" They sought, in other words, to create
their own monopoly. Yet at the same time, the leaders of the bar
eliminated the most obvious badges of a privileged class." They
trumpeted education as way to eradicate the networks of privilege
that existed among the wealthy established class.'"
In the late 1980s, historians added layers of complication to this
story by looking at the professions in context. They explained the
emergence of modern professions as a part of the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth century ambivalence about meritocracy and elitism."
The professions, as several of these historians argued, grew up amidst
99. For an overview of Weber's contribution to the idea of professionalism, see
ABEL, supra note 41, at 14-30. See, e.g., LARSON, supra note 96, at 34; see also KEITH
M. MACDONALD, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 29 (1995).
100. See ABEL, supra note 41, at 14-30.
101. See id.
102. See Maxwell H. Bloomfield, Law: The Development of a Profession, in THE
PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 33 (Nathan 0. Hatch ed., 1988); Haber, supra
note 78, at 1582. For a history of these monopoly restrictions, see Bruce A. Green,
The Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their
Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV.
1115, 1118-40 (2000).
103. See ABEL, supra note 41, at 47-73, 112-15; AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 3-7,
12-13,40-74; FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 39-41.
104. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 39-41.
105. See id. at 33-39.
106. See id at 37.
107. See id.
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that tension.1" Not simply a tool of the new industrial classes, the
professions served a more complex function by organizing and
commandeering knowledge in order to consolidate power.'0 Because
they were organized around merit and skill rather than privilege and
wealth, the professions provided a radically egalitarian way of seeking
status.1 o In other words, at least theoretically, the professions were
open to all, which threatened to render status a fluid concept.
As Samuel Haber argues, the new middle class longing for status
intensified rather than subsided amidst the increasingly consumer-
oriented, market-driven, competitive, and individualistic culture of
turn-of-the-century America."1 ' This new world seemed hostile to
inherited privilege, but the professions provided a pocket in which
this oddly pre-modern elitism could thrive still, unmarred by the
assault."2 At the same time, the rapid expansion of corporate
capitalism threatened to replace professional status with wealth and
power."' The American Dream seemed to shift from achieving status
through participation in a professional group to obtaining wealth
through ingenuity. The professions responded, according to
sociologist Andrew Abbott, by intensifying monopolistic controls
through ethical rules.114
Professionalism has always had a moral component. Even as (or
perhaps especially as) the rhetoric of the professions shifted its
emphasis on political leadership to technocratic expertise in the early
twentieth century, leaders of the bar insisted that lawyers are not
interested in their own gain but rather are concerned with their
clients, the community, and justice."' Most historians have cynically
dismissed the moral rhetoric of professionalism as fundamentally
108. See Nathan 0. Hatch, Introduction: The Professions in a Democratic Culture,
in THE PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 102, at 3; see also
BLEDSTEIN, supra note 8.
109. See JAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSOLE AND CLASSIFY: THE FRENCH PSYCHIATRIC
PROFESSION IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 10-11 (1987).
110. See BLEDSTEIN, supra note 8.
111. See SAMUEL HABER, THE QUEST FOR AUTHORITY AND HONOR IN THE
AMERICAN PROFESSIONS, 1750-1900, at xi (1988).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See Andrew Abbott, Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. Soc. 855, 875 (1983).
Abbott argues that the push for greater monopoly restrictions tends to follow times
of great stress to professional status. He argues that the Canons responded to exactly
this strain in the early part of the twentieth century. See id. at 875-77.
115. See Solomon, supra note 3, at 144--46.
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disingenuous. Lawyers, they claim, deliberately described their
mission as a moral one to justify the market control they exert over
their own profession." But some historians have taken issue with
this interpretation. Robert Gordon, for instance, has argued that
lawyers at the turn of the century did take their commitment to the
public seriously in representing private clients.1 s The language that
professionals used to justify themselves is itself important. While
lawyers may fall terribly far from their aspirations, rhetoric can also
function to inspire men and women to live up to a higher goal, to
pursue a good beyond their own self-interest."' Especially when
doing so earns you not merely a place in heaven or the private
satisfaction of self-sacrifice, but also a sense of belonging in and to
that larger community.
After the Civil War, the legal profession secured its national
identity as an elite group with political, economic, and social power.1
Lawyers, it seemed, would control not only the application of the law
but also its creation and its meaning.'2 1 From the very moment of its
greatest power and prestige, the bar experienced pressure to open its
doors to newer members of society." The expanding, heterogeneous,
urban culture seemed to gradually knock at the door of inherited
privilege and elitism.'" But the powerful elite did not give in so
easily.24 After World War II, the professions, like many other areas
of American society, felt the push for inclusion and democratic
egalitarianism. More diverse people had access to higher education
116. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 43-52 (criticizing the bar for excluding
outsiders by heavily regulating and prohibiting the use of contingency fees); id. at
106-09 (arguing that the bar raised educational requirements to restrict entry to
those who already had power within the country and the profession); WILLIAM P.
LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN AMERICAN LEGAL
EDUCATION 91-92 (1994) (arguing that the educational requirements of the
professionalization project closed the profession to all but a small elite); POWELL,
supra note 75, at 17-18 (arguing that bar membership requirements kept ethnic
minorities from achieving certain rank in the profession).
117. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 102.
118. See Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual, supra note 57, at 51-52; see also
KIMBALL, supra note 8, at 104-05 (arguing that the moral rhetoric of professionalism
was not mere subterfuge but rather part of a process through which the group of
lawyers defined itself).
119. See KIMBALL, supra note 8, at 104-05.
120. See Gawalt, supra note 72, at vi-vii.
121. See id.
122. See id. at viii; see generallyAUERBACH, supra note 7.
123. See generally AUERBACH, supra note 7.
124. See id.
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and were pursuing law degrees." The bar had an increasingly hard
time resisting this trend.126
Several recent historians have noted that these histories of the
profession focus almost exclusively on the elite.1 While they
mention other lawyers scrambling at the door of privilege, these
studies neglect to examine the experience of other lawyers, like
women, African-Americans, and solo practitioners." Scholars like
Kenneth Mack and Susan Carle have described the work of lawyers
outside the elite, and these case studies have done much to enrich our
understanding of the profession and its history.'29
What even these historians have overlooked is how its mashed-up
ideology left professionalism open to alternate interpretations and
uses. Julius Henry Cohen's book on professionalism reminds us of
the Jacksonian strand in the rhetoric of the professions." It
demonstrates how newcomers could (and still can) use the language
of professionalism in an effort not to defeat the more elitist reality but
to find a back door in-an imagined route to becoming a part of that
elite. Cohen drew on the republican language of moral virtue and
civic participation to invent a road for himself-not only to inclusion
but to leadership in the American polity.
Of course, we cannot forget the very real lessons of the neo-
Marxist historians. But before we celebrate the demise of
professionalism, it is worth remembering that professionalism has
promised newcomers and outsiders a way to enter into the larger
community. It has offered them at least a promise that with enough
hard work and determination, they too can join a small group of
moral and intellectual leaders of the country.'' None of this is to
125. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 457-59.
126. See id.; AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 232; POWELL, supra note 75, at xvii.
127. See Kenneth W. Mack, A Social History of Everyday Practice: Sadie TM
Alexander and the Incorporation of Black Women into the American Legal
Profession, 1925-1960, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1405, 1409 (2002); see also, e.g.,
VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN
HISTORY 5-6 (1998); KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN
LAWYER IN AMERICA, 1638 TO THE PRESENT 249 (1986); Susan D. Carle, Race, Class,
and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 97, 98
(2002).
128. See Mack, supra note 127, at 1409; see also DRACHMAN, supra note 127, at 5-
6; MORELLO, supra note 127, at 249; Carle, supra note 127, at 98.
129. See, e.g., Carle, supra note 127; Mack, supra note 127.
130. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 242.
131. Aziz Rana has argued that the governing role of lawyers is not necessarily
elitist. If we tap into an older tradition where all work is a site for moral and political
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suggest that this is purely a good thing. It is merely to point out that
professional ideology reflects (and in turn helps create) important
and complicated themes in American history. Julius Henry Cohen
reminds us that professionalism is, in addition to other things, a
receptacle for a particularly American dream of self-invention: a
dream of the past disappearing and the future becoming something of
our own making.
II. JuLIUs HENRY COHEN AND THE PROFESSIONALISM MELTING
POT
Julius Henry Cohen was born in Brooklyn, New York, in 1873.132
At the age of twenty-three, he graduated from New York University
and was admitted to the New York State Bar the following year." A
prominent New York lawyer, Cohen served as counsel to the Transit
Reform Committee of 100, the Merchants Association, and the Port
Authority." In 1897, he investigated and prosecuted Asa Bird
Gardiner, the corrupt Manhattan District Attorney who had deep ties
to the Tammany Hall political machine."'s The New York Times
labeled him the "controversy minimizer" as he worked to resolve the
1910 garment workers strike."' A prominent attorney with
connections to the established elite members of the bar, Cohen was
an influential and powerful lawyer in New York. 7 He published his
book, The Law: Business or Profession?, in 1916.'" Cohen was an
active member of the NYCLA where he chaired the Committee on
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, the New York State Bar
Association, and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(ABCNY). 39
participation, then lawyering, like all other occupations, becomes a significant part of
the political order. See Rana, supra note 36, at 1670.
132. See Julius Cohen, 77, La wyer 53 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1950, at 12.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. A Talk fith Juus H Cohen, Minimizer of Controversy, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Jan. 26, 1913, available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=
F10B1EFE385Fl3738DDDAFA94D9405B838DF1D3.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See COHEN, supra note 19.
139. Julius Cohen, 77, Lawyer 53 Years, supra note 132; see also POWELL, supra
note 75, at 40-41. Cohen is perhaps best remembered for his work in support of the
Federal Arbitration Act. See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New
FederalArbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926). In some ways, his effort to bring
peaceful resolution to commercial and labor disputes mirrors his efforts within the
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Cohen grew up at a time when anti-Semitism was mounting." The
economic recessions and accompanying class conflict of the 1890s,
which were hitting just as he entered college and intensifying as he
graduated, exacerbated an already tense and deeply ambivalent
attitude toward Jews in America.141 The American legal profession
was far from immune from the general attitude toward Jews. The
elite of the bar kept Jewish professionals at a safe distance, allowing
some to play in their ranks but never fully opening the doors to
them.142 President Wilson nominated Louis Brandeis to the Supreme
Court in January 1916, the same year that Cohen published his
book. 3 The controversy over Brandeis's nomination focused on his
alleged radical positions, but historians and biographers have agreed
that much of the resistance from the established bar was a product of
anti-Semitism."
These underlying issues remain at a safe distance in Cohen's book
on the legal profession. His experiences with discrimination, which
were no doubt immediate, do not figure in. Cohen used the rhetoric
of the professions to promote a meritocracy open to all who could
meet its requirements." The elitism of inherited privilege gave way
in Cohen's reading to privilege based on intelligence, hard work, and
character.'"
profession to minimize the permanence and intractability of difference. For a history
of arbitration in America, see generally IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION:
REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION (1992).
140. See John Higham, And-Semitism in the Gilded Age: A Reinterpretation, 43
Miss. VALLEY HIsT.REv. 559, 563-66 (1957).
141. See id. at 564-65. More recent historians have criticized what they perceive as
the post-war generation of historians downplaying anti-Semitism as an endemic part
of American society and culture. See MICHAEL N. DOBKOWSKI, THE TARNISHED
DREAM: THE BASIS OF AMERICAN ANTI-SEMrrISM 3-7 (1979). Dobkowski
particularly takes issue with attributing the cause of anti-Semitism to economic
forces. But ultimately, historians seem to agree that hatred and bigotry against Jews
rose throughout the Gilded Age. While it may have ebbed and flowed, as Higham
argues, it undoubtedly mounted as the thirties approached. See Higham, supra note
140, at 571.
142. See, e.g., AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 70-73.
143. See Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's
Lawyer, 105 YALE L. J. 1445, 1447-49 (1996).
144. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 71.
145. See COHEN, supra note 19, at xv (arguing that the law has a value to society
and ought to be limited to those who are "specially trained and qualified"); id. at 1-
23 (discussing disbarment of lawyers who do not possess the proper moral and
intellectual qualities).
146. See id.
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In 1916, Julius Henry Cohen published a book called The Law:
Business or Profession? This book offers insight into the role
professionalism played in its early years in America and helps answer
what place it ought to have now. At the turn of the twentieth century,
professionalism offered newcomers of all sorts an imagined avenue
not only to material advancement but also to a true sense of
belonging and leadership.147 It offered at least the promise and
possibility of citizenship in the traditional republican sense of the
word. Professionalism not only offered the hope of belonging and
partaking of the country's riches but also held out the promise that a
recent immigrant or someone lingering for whatever reason on the
fringe could, through hard work and determination, contribute to
society. In so doing, that person could earn true membership in its
ranks. The professions still hold out hope in the form of that
particular version of the American Dream.
Julius Henry Cohen argued against a growing sense that business
clients had rendered the idea of a separate legal profession
obsolete." In a familiar republican lament, he decried the decline of
the professional ideal only to argue for the ultimate need and
potential for its redemption.149 He cataloged the disarray, the abuses,
and the degeneration of professionalism just as he defended it as a
cornerstone of modem democracy.so But professionalism itself
comprehends that rhetoric of decline and regeneration. Lawyers, for
instance, are always at once the source of the problem and the
solution.
Cohen used professionalism to recreate the liberal values that
seemed subtly threatened by his own experience and by the social
147. See id. at 31-32 (arguing that the legal profession is necessary to solve
society's "stupendous" problems and promote "the harmony and coordination of its
parts, its convenience, its permanency, and its facility"); id. at 318 (arguing that
lawyers are responsible for truth and justice in society because "the administration of
the law is Justice itself").
148. See id. at xiii-xviii, 271 (noting that the relationship between a lawyer and a
client ought not to be commodified).
149. See id. at 309-15.
150. It was not uncommon at the time to think of history as cyclical. Evolution and
Social Darwinian theories led many historians and social critics to conclude that
history itself follows the pattern of birth, decay, and death. Progressives often added
regeneration to the list, envisioning a positive and optimistic progression toward a
better world as the old order died, while the best and strongest aspects survived
spawning a new culture in its wake. See PETER NOVICK, THAT NOBLE DREAM: THE
"OBJEcnvITY QUESTION" AND THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PROFESSION 92-100
(1988); STOw PERSONS, AMERICAN MINDS: A HISTORY OF IDEAS 227-28 (1958).
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realty in turn-of-the-century New York."s' By promoting
professionalism, Cohen attempted to create an Enlightenment world
(or at least a fantasy of one) in which social and moral progress would
emerge through science, education, and hard work.152 The only place
to find all three of these values, he argued, was in the professions in
general and the legal profession in particular.' Cohen infused this
notion of progress through professional advancement with a moral
component, insisting that the legal profession was a receptacle for
morality and integrity and the only possible source of its perpetuation
in a world that was becoming increasingly secular, anonymous, and
ruthless. 54 Professionalism allowed Cohen to envision harmony
151. For a description of the cultural dislocation in turn-of-the-century America,
see generally T.J. JACKSON LEARS, No PLACE OF GRACE: ANTI-MODERNISM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CULTURE (1880-1920) (1981). See also RICHARD
HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R (1955); WIEBE, supra
note 8.
152. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 316-17 ("We must permit freedom of access to
the Bar, but this freedom of access must be conditioned upon adequate moral and
professional training. The schools of law must be open to all men, but the 'door of
admission to the Bar must swing on reluctant hinges, and only he be permitted to
pass through who has by continued and patient study fitted himself for the work of a
safe counselor and the place of a leader.").
153. See id.
154. H. Stuart Hughes argued that this period in European intellectual thought
marked a clear revolt against the Positivism of the previous century. While Cohen,
unlike the European thinkers Hughes analyzed, was not expounding a theory of
social integration, he too managed to mix a reverence for science and reason with a
role for morality and free will. See H. STUART HUGHES, CONSCIOUSNESS AND
SOCIETY: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 1890-1930, at 33-
66 (2002). Many scholars have written about the condition of modernity. See, e.g.,
MARSHALL BERMAN, ALL THAT IS SOLID MELTS INTO AIR: THE EXPERIENCE OF
MODERNITY (1982); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY
(1990). T.J. Jackson Lears has argued that America in the early twentieth century
embraced a kind of anti-modernism in which people sought the intensity and release
that was absent in the capitalist world that demanded perpetual psychological self-
control. See LEARS, supra note 151, at 47-58. Professionalism fits into Lears's thesis.
It, too, provided an antidote to the banality of the secular world by importing a
language of religious devotion and intense dedication to a worldly pursuit. Other
historians have tracked the specific changes in America that accompanied
immigration, industrialization, and urbanization at the turn of the nineteenth century
and argued about the culture's response to these phenomena. See HOFSTADTER,
supra note 151, at 323-30; GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A
REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); WIEBE, supra note 8,
at 164--95; John D. Buenker, The Progressive Era: A Search for a Synthesis, 51 MID-
AMERICA 175 (1969); Samuel P. Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal
Government in the Progressive Era, 55 PAC. Nw. Q. 157, 157-59 (1964); David P.
Thelen, Social Tensions and the Ongins of Progressivism, 56 J. AM. HIsT. 323, 335-41
(1969). For a summary of this debate, see Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of
Progressivism, 10 REVs. AM. HIST. 113 (1982).
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between individual rights and social order just as the strain between
the two seemed so glaringly apparent in his own life and experience.
Perhaps most importantly, without drawing attention to it, Cohen
promoted professionalism to preserve his own tenuous route to
assimilation.' As historians have explained, the professions
provided a road, albeit an imperfect one, to middle class life for the
children of immigrants and ethnic minorities."" By supplying avenues
of advancement, professions like law and medicine to some limited
extent provided access to the 'good life' in America."' But in reality
the professions were saturated with prejudice and, in the early
twentieth century, the top echelon of the bar remained out of reach
for most immigrants."' As a system of thought, professionalism made
good on the promise. In other words, the rhetoric of the professions
offered a route to leadership to all, regardless of race or ethnicity."
The rhetoric of professionalism suggested that anyone could eradicate
difference and cloak him or herself in an identity that was both
American and at least on the surface agnostic as to ethnic, religious,
or racial identity. According to the rhetoric, professionals were
stripped of personal characteristics. They were bastions of expertise
and, ideally, virtue. As a Jew, Cohen could imagine and promote a
route to citizenship, which, in theory, avoided all the practical
obstacles that he faced in his real struggle to succeed in American life.
In a way, professionalism was as significant to Julius Henry Cohen's
success as his practical achievements as a lawyer.o
The educational requirements that Cohen defended so vigorously
served a purpose other than just monopoly restrictions on entrance to
the profession. In Cohen's imagination, education provided the key
to assimilation.'6  It was this process of learning that erased the
particularity of one's immigrant background and allowed one to
assume a new distinctly professional (and American) identity. It was
education that replaced the insular culture of the inner city ghetto
155. He does not say so explicitly. Nor does he even mention his religion
anywhere in his book, but his emphasis on moral and intellectual worth, hard work,
and education are all tacit justifications for his own ascent within the profession.
156. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 457-505.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 459-60.
159. COHEN, supra note 19, at xiii-xviii, 316-17.
160. For a discussion of the barriers to women, blacks, and Jews in the profession,
see FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 29-33.
161. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 125-41 (arguing that law schools were essential
for building character and training students to become good lawyers).
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with a new set of mores designed for a new community. In Cohen's
imagination, the three-year law school provided the fire that would
ultimately fuel the melting pot." Without education, the immigrant
was thrown into the law with his particular, parochial, old-world ethic
intact-a recipe, according to Cohen, for corruption and the
disintegration of professional values."
While it seems somehow silly and naive from our vantage point to
suppose that entrance into the legal profession offered the key to
social acceptance in 1914, Cohen used professionalism to help create
the reality that was just out of his reach." Cohen used the rhetoric of
professionalism, its decline, and its rebirth to argue not only that
immigrants and minorities could access American culture, but also to
suggest subtly that immigrants possessed a unique ability to
contribute to the professions because of their identity as outsiders."
Their erstwhile place on the periphery suited them to serve as
mediators between the needs of individuals and the dictates of the
law. The immigrant could earn his membership in society through
education, but he would never be absorbed completely. He would
never lose his ability to critique the law from the outside, providing
that extra check, that extra balance that Alexis de Tocqueville always
imagined as part of the role of American lawyers.'"
In the 1920s, Cohen argued for a unified state bar association,
insisting that the selective admission based on ethnicity undermined
professional ideals." He argued that while there were forty women
lawyers at the annual NYCLA dinner:
The daughter of a distinguished lawyer, fired by ambition to follow
in his footsteps, might win the highest honors in her college, come
out at the head of her class in the law school, be the first in the list of
those admitted by the Appellate Division, overwhelmingly
demonstrate her character and fitness to the appropriate committee,
engage in the practice of law and at once win esteem and
confidence, yet she could knock at the doors of the city bar
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
167. See POWELL, supra note 75, at 41.
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association until the skin fell from her knuckles and the door-keeper
would keep her out.16
Despite his advocacy for inclusion, Cohen did not want to open the
doors of the profession to all.'" He fought to replace the superficial
characteristics of inherited privilege with merit."o Cohen led the
movement for a unified bar."" He argued against discrimination but
he was certainly not a modern day Jacksonian, arguing to dismantle
professional privilege and make the law accessible to all."2 It is
particularly significant that in arguing for a unified bar, Cohen did not
use the example of his own ethnicity and religion. He used a different
marginalized group instead."3 As Samuel Levine has noted, Cohen's
own relationship to Judaism is not particularly clear.174 There are
shreds of evidence that he may have left his religion behind for a
more secular existence." But he did not abandon his background
exactly. The idea of the professions as a route from the periphery to
the center for those with intelligence, dedication, and character must
have been formed by his experience as a Jew in America. Nor did he
completely shed his experience as an outsider as he worked to reform
the profession from within.
Cohen published his book, The Law: Business, or Profession?, two
years after Louis Brandeis published his collection of essays with a
very similar title, Business-A Profession." Perhaps this is a
coincidence. But maybe not. Brandeis argued, in a speech with the
same name as his book, that business had become a profession.
Cohen would not go so far. He certainly agreed with Brandeis that
business had assumed many of the traits of a profession and that
many businessmen conducted their affairs with a thoughtful eye to
168. See POWELL, supra note 75, at 43 (quoting Julius H. Cohen, The National Call
for the Organization of an All Inclusive Bar, 4 N.Y. L. REV. 95 (1926)); see also Julius
H. Cohen, An Address at the Annual Banquet of the Rhode Island Bar Association
(Jan. 15, 1926).
169. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 316-17.
170. See id.
171. Id
172. See Julius Henry Cohen, Address, The Community's Interest in Hig
Standards of Qualification for Admission to the Bar, in REPORT OF THE TWENTY-
NINTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 157, 165
(1924).
173. See Levine, supra note 20, at 10-12.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. Louis D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS-A PROFESSION 1-12 (1914).
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the good of all.'" But there is something in his book, an answer to
Brandeis, in a way, suggesting that the legal profession would always
have a greater role than business in preserving the good of society.
Cohen began his book by cataloguing disciplinary cases."' He
sought to convince his reader that the courts and the bar were busy
policing the ranks of lawyers, discarding those who were unfit and
preserving the dignity of the profession. For the most part, the
miscreant lawyers were nameless. With a few notable exceptions,
they lacked attributes. They could have been Jewish, Italian,
Catholic, women, or Protestants. The reader is left to guess by the
names in the footnotes." This must have been intentional. By
omitting personal characteristics, the only thing we know is that these
lawyers were bad. They harmed their clients, the public, and the
reputation of the profession. That, alone, warrants exclusion. Cohen
capitulated in the restrictive policies of the bar, but by stripping these
lawyers of their racial or ethnic identity, he disassociated these sorts
of rules from animus against certain groups of newcomers entering
the profession.
Cohen mentioned one case in which the court suspended a lawyer's
license because he falsely claimed on behalf of his wealthy corporate
client that a conversation was privileged.'"' Here, Cohen's egalitarian
strand gained the pen. The lawyer, it seems, claimed that his acts
were justified because his powerful client brought wealth to society."
As such, he argued, his client should have been shielded from
liability. Society deserved protection from plaintiffs seeking to suck
its resources dry. Cohen quoted the court's admonition:
If the profession is to have the respect of the community; if it is to be
trusted by courts and by others who have to do with the
administration of justice, its members must realize that a crime is a
crime whosoever commits it . . . . [N]either his wealth nor
prominence will protect a lawyer in going outside of his professional
obligations to shield him from the consequences of his acts.
The threat to the legal profession, in other words, comes from all
ranks-the elite representing the most prestigious clients and the
177. See COHEN, supra note 19, at 40-41.
178. See id. at 1-23.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 16-17.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 17.
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rank and file whose clients are powerless and poor. It is not race,
ethnicity, wealth, or status that determine worth in the world of
professionalism, but rather intelligence and character, two things that
were distributed equally throughout the growingly segmented
profession.
Cohen devoted much of his time to battling the unauthorized
practice of law.'" He served on bar committees dedicated to studying
and eliminating the problem of the unauthorized practice of law.'
Cohen consistently argued that laymen-notaries and corporations
particularly-could not protect clients adequately.'" The public
suffered as the court invalidated wills and deeds created by
individuals with no experience in the law." Of course, as many
historians have noted this self-serving rhetoric masked the self-
interest of the profession.'" Lawyers could keep prices high by
eliminating competition." While serving as the chairman of a
committee fighting the unauthorized practice of law, Cohen admitted
that many notaries guilty of violating the rules were foreign born.
But in the same breath, he explained that in many countries other
than the United States, notaries were educated and qualified to draft
wills and deeds.' In a gesture unnecessary to his central argument,
Cohen excused the immigrants as ignorant rather than malicious or
greedy.
As historians like Auerbach have argued, professionalism may
have been used to exclude immigrants and establish a kind of
professional aristocracy.'9 But at the same time, the rhetoric
contained the seeds for ihe extinction of this sort of inherited
184. See A Talk with Julius H Cohen, Minimizer of Controversy, supra note 135;
see also, e.g., Julius Henry Cohen, Address, The Unlawful Practice of Law, in
CALIFORNIA BAR ASSOCIATION, PROCEEDINGS THIRTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION
66-88 (1922); Julius H. Cohen, Unlawful Practice of the LawMust Be Prevented, 101
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 44,44-48 (1922); Julius H. Cohen, Lay Practice
of Law Injures Clients, Not the Legal Profession, 5 J. AM. JUD. Soc. 52, 52-53 (1921-
22); Julius Henry Cohen, Unlawful Practice of the Law by Laymen and Corporations,
22 LAw STUD. HELPER 12, 12-15 (1914) [hereinafter Cohen, Laymen and
Corporations].
185. See Cohen, Laymen and Corporations, supra note 184, at 12-13.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 12.
188. See ABEL, supra note 41, at 112-13; AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 74-129.
189. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
190. See Cohen, Laymen and Corporations, supra note 184, at 12.
191. See id.
192. See AUERBACH, supra note 7, at 4-13.
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privilege. And Cohen-a newcomer who had managed to make his
way in-emphasized this alternate aspect of professionalism.
Quoting an appellate court opinion, Cohen insisted that
The practice of law is not a business open to all ... but a personal
right, limited to a few persons of good moral character. .. with
special qualifications ascertained and certified after a long course of
study, both general and professional, and a thorough examination by
a state board appointed for the purpose.... The right to practice
law is in the nature of a franchise from the state conferred only for
merit. It cannot be assigned or inherited but must be earned by hard
study and good conduct. 93
As he progressed in his career, Cohen grew more explicit in his
understanding of the professions as a guaranteed path to success for
worthy immigrants. In an address at the Maryland State Bar
Association in 1924, Cohen affirmatively stated that the profession
must remain open to all.'" He began by defending the profession in a
way that even then must have seemed familiar. The profession,
unlike most obligations, is noble because its members serve a greater
good.'9 There are rules and principles, which dictate that the lawyer
must pursue something beyond his own self-interest." Cohen
insisted that this public function was more important than that of
other professions.'" "Society," he claimed, "cannot exist without
law."'9  Lawyers created the fabric of the community.1 " He
emphasized that lawyers, unlike judges, have obligations to both the
law and to individuals." It is precisely this position on the border, he
argued, that guarantees liberty.'
Cohen then reasoned that in order to perform this function, the bar
must select people who are both knowledgeable and virtuous.' The
only way to do so was through strict entry requirements.' He
concluded by discussing why the British system cannot suffice.? He
193. COHEN, supra note 19, at 247-48.
194. See Cohen, supra note 172, at 158-66.
195. See id. at 159.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 158-60.
198. Id. at 160.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 160-61.
201. See id.
202. See id. at 164.
203. See id.
204. See id. at 165.
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wrote, "[b]ecause of the very important functions the bar performs,
the people of our country do not want an aristocratic bar, they want a
democratic bar. They want a bar of made up [sic] men who come
from all parts of the country and from all classes."' Cohen then
directly addressed the question of how America could sustain a
democratic bar that serves such a critical function:
It means that the bar shall be open to everyone, no matter where he
comes from, no matter where he was born, no matter what his race
or religion is, that the opportunities for education shall be so broad
that every man of capacity can ac uire the necessary education to fit
himself for admission to the bar.
Cohen, who was generally a fairly content member of a legal elite,
which at the time sought to eliminate night schools, went on to defend
part-time legal education as fundamental to the professional
mission.' He concluded,
It is possible in America to have a democratic bar responsive to the
general sentiment of the country so that those who have in their
hands the great power of administering justice shall come from all
sections of the country, all sections of the people, and yet at the
same time to insist upon the very highest standards of moral
qualifications for admission to the bar.2
Cohen used the rhetoric of the professions to argue that outsiders and
immigrants could become not only acceptable members of the
profession, but moreover critical ones. They connected the bar to a
constantly changing democratic spirit while simultaneously
controlling the meaning and interpretation of the country's laws.
His faith in the educational system to instill knowledge and virtue,
reward merit, and provide equal opportunities to all certainly seems
outdated. But the hope for a meritocracy, for a way to create
something akin to democratic access through education, is not dead
yet. Like the professional ideal itself, this aspect of the
Enlightenment project is useful to retain as a (perhaps unattainable)
goal.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. Id.
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III. BEYOND THE MULTICULTURALISM-ASSIMILATION DIVIDE
Cohen's optimism, his ability to embrace professionalism as a
source of transformation, in which the particularities of one's
background melted away, may have thrived on a different zeitgeist.
Nativism, at the turn of the century, had a different tone than it does
today. At the risk of glorifying a rather troubled time in our past,
even most xenophobes had a relatively welcoming attitude toward
foreigners and minorities for a time.m Americans, for the most part,
had not yet fully embraced a fixed notion of race and identity. 210 The
nativism of the early 1900s largely shared the optimistic tone of its
era. While decrying the poor hygiene and moral depravity of
immigrant populations, most reformers had faith in the nation's
power to transform the masses and rehabilitate them in its image.211
They believed that America's unique wonder was not its Anglo-
Saxon race, exactly, but rather the national spirit most nobly
embodied in that race.2 12 So reformers-temperance societies, social
workers, and women's groups, to name a few-confidently paraded
into the inner city slums with the intent to convert the newest
members to America's code of conduct.2" As historians have
repeatedly argued, this agenda was fueled by paternalistic
assumptions about the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon way of life.214
Progressive reformers were ignorant about the value of other cultures
and their unique contributions to the communities in which they now
lived.' Furthermore, scholars have argued, the effort to convert
immigrants to "American" values was in some ways even more
insidious than overt hatred and exclusion. 216 And that is true-in a
way. But the idea of the melting pot did offer a theoretical place to
newcomers who were willing to work hard to relinquish the old ways
209. See JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
NATIVISM, 1860-1925, at 106-23 (1955).
210. Seeid.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 119-22.
214. For a historiography of the settlement movement, see ALLEN F. DAVIS,
SPEARHEADS FOR REFORM: THE SOCIAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT, 1880-1914, at xvii-xxiv (1984).
215. HIGHAM, supra note 209, at 119-22.
216. See generally RUTH BORDIN, WOMEN AND TEMPERANCE: THE QUEST FOR
POWER AND LIBERTY, 1873-1900 (1981); PAUL BOYER, URBAN MASSES AND MORAL
REFORM IN AMERICA, 1890-1920 (1992); DAVIS, supra note 214; ELLEN FITZPATRICK,
ENDLESS CRUSADE: WOMEN SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM (1993).
62 [ Vol. XL
ROUTE TO CITIZENSHIP
and fuse with the new culture. It offered a way to imagine success in
the new country.217
The melting pot ideal, with all its arrogance and condescension, is
not something we should to strive to replicate. How then is the story
of Cohen and the perspective it lends to professionalism relevant? To
understand if and how Cohen's version of professionalism can fit into
a modern dialog, it is useful to explore how theories of integration,
Americanization, and cultural differences have evolved. Cohen used
professionalism to create a route to assimilation.218 He imagined a
world in which differences faded as professionals shared a language of
expertise with a community that had proved commitment,
intelligence, and moral worth.219 But the particularities of Cohen's
life, his ethnic origin, and his past made their way back in and shaped
his understanding of the professions. Our attitude toward cultural
difference has changed since Cohen's time, but his understanding and
use of professionalism is still relevant and worth preserving.
The rhetoric of the melting pot, born in Julius Henry Cohen's day
and made popular in the 1950s, has gone out of style.' Historians,
political theorists, and sociologists have all pointed out how the
assimilation ideal masked racism, xenophobia, and cultural
imperialism." The middle class reformers of the Progressive Era
who sought to assimilate the newcomers to America condescendingly
217. In 1911, Franz Boas, perhaps the most well-known anthropologist of the time,
published a report on immigration designed to prove that immigrants' traits were
evolving to suit the new American environment. Franz Boas, Introductory, in
REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION: CHANGES IN BODILY FORM OF
DESCENDENTS OF IMMIGRANTS, S. Doc. No. 208, at 1-3 (2d Sess. 1911). As John
Higham has argued, Boas essentially devoted his academic life to proving that
immigrants and ethnic minorities would shed bad traits and meld into American
society. See HIGHAM, supra note 174, at 125. It is not a coincidence that this theory
of racial dissolution should come from Boas, who was himself a Jewish immigrant
from Germany. Boas was, in his own work, describing a process by which the
attributes that separated him from the mainstream would disappear. He was writing
just as the influx of Eastern European Jews seemed to threaten the German Jewish
ascent, which made Boas's theory even more critical.
218. See supra Part II.
219. See COHEN, supra note 19, at xv, 1-23.
220. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS 14 (1995). The term "Melting Pot" was popularized by a play with
the same title, written by Israel Zangwill in 1908. Kymlicka explains that after World
War II, liberals hoped that the emphasis on universal human rights would resolve
minority conflict so the United Nations and other international initiatives shifted
focus from the rights of particular minorities to an emphasis on universal human
rights. See id. at 2-3.
221. See id. at 14.
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hoped to teach them hygiene, morality, and manners.m They hoped,
in other words, to impose the language and customs of the majority
on immigrant groups. Recently, historians have argued that between
the wars, some reformers were more sensitive to cultural difference.'
Their effort to assimilate immigrants included a celebration of the
cultural gifts that each different group could bring to the whole?
This "cultural gifts movement" was limited in its approach to
socioeconomic difference and the entrenched and complicated nature
of prejudice but its proponents did recognize the value that diversity
could bring to education and civic life?
In the 1950s and early 1960s, the assimilation ideal reached a new
level of popularity. After World War II, historians, public
intellectuals, and the media sought to minimize difference and to
celebrate a uniquely American spirit, a kind of Anglo-Saxon
essence? But the rise of identity politics in the 1960s put an end to
the focus on assimilation? The Vietnam War and the social unrest
that accompanied it undermined the faith in a benevolent Anglo-
Saxon spirit. Historians and cultural critics began to celebrate
separate immigrant cultures just as popular social movements
promoted diverse racial, ethnic, gender, and sexual identities.'
In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars of international law, political
theory, and philosophy promoted multiculturalism. Proponents of
multiculturalism, unlike the champions of assimilation, acknowledged
and celebrated difference.' Assimilationists hoped to impose the
language and customs of the majority on immigrant groups.'o Critical
of this approach, scholars of international law, political theory, and
philosophy promoted multiculturalism in its stead."
222. See HIGHAM, supra note 209, at 119-22.
223. See DIANA SELIG, AMERICANS ALL: THE CULTURAL GIFrs MOVEMENT 2
(2008).
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. KYMLICKA, supra note 220, at 14. See generally OSCAR HANDLIN, THE
UPROOTED: THE EPIc STORY OF THE GREAT MIGRATION THAT MADE THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE (1951).
227. KYMLICKA, supra note 220, at 61-69.
228. See HERBERT G. GuTMAN, WORK, CULTURE, AND SOCIETY IN
INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA (1976) (arguing that immigrants maintained their own
ethnic identities).
229. See KYMLICKA, supra note 220, at 11, 14.
230. See id.
231. See id.
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Multiculturalism, unlike assimilation, acknowledges and celebrates
difference. In America, multiculturalism was born mostly as an
educational movement, a movement that encouraged schools to teach
students to celebrate difference and embrace diverse cultures rather
than allowing the majority to displace and denigrate them." So in
the 1970s, Stanford invested in residential houses based on ethnic and
racial difference,' the Supreme Court celebrated diversity as a
compelling state interest,' and private grade schools sought to
increase the racial and ethnic diversity of their student bodies."
Almost immediately, however, multiculturalism came under attack.
According to one critique, multiculturalism breeds distrust.' It
divides and atomizes rather than unites.' We inevitably lose the
chance of civic membership of a robust, or really any, sense of the
public good as we all retreat to enclaves defined by our ethnicity,
race, gender, or sexual orientation.'
Some political theorists have further claimed that multiculturalism
is inconsistent with liberalism." How could a liberal democracy
tolerate and even celebrate groups that deny rights to its members?
Certainly, if one were to import multiculturalism from the
educational context to the polity, it would be hard for a liberal state
to tolerate and encourage groups that routinely discriminated against
or abused certain members of that group. Liberalism and
multiculturalism may not be mutually exclusive, but there are strange
tensions and hypocrisies. One problem with multiculturalism is that
by protecting minority communities, we can inadvertently endorse
the mistreatment of some within that community. For example,
232. See Richard Rorty, The Demonization of Mudticulturalism, 7 J. BLACKS
HIGHER EDUC. 74,74 (1995).
233. See Madhavi Devasher, Campus Defends Its Ethnic Theme Houses,
STANFORD DAILY, Nov. 19,2002.
234. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 279 (1977); see also
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,321-24 (2003).
235. See Devasher, supra note 233.
236. See Amy Gutmann, Introduction to MULTICULTURALISM AND "THE POLIrICS
OF RECOGNITION" 3, 18-21 (1992).
237. See id.
238. Historian and legal scholar Reva Siegel has argued recently that the "swing"
justices on the Supreme Court have begun to recognize this problem (which she
labels "balkanization") and integrate it into their decisions concerning affirmative
action. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground ofDecision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 1278,1280-1303 (2011).
239. See BRIAN BARRY, THE CULTURE OF EQUALITY 163 (2001).
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scholars have argued that many ethnic groups treat women poorly.'
By demonstrating respect, tolerance, and approval of these insular
communities, a multicultural state risks inadvertently legitimizing
these destructive sorts of hierarchies."
Recently, political theorists have addressed this tension by trying to
reconcile multiculturalism with liberalism. Bhikhu Parekh, for
instance, has argued that we have to nurture diversity but also
encourage a sense of belonging to the state as a whole.242 The state
should encourage and protect cultural rights, which allow individuals
and groups to cherish and perpetuate their cultural identity. 24 3 But as
a community, we must balance the claims of groups against the rights
of individual members of those groups.2" A multicultural state
cannot ignore that we all live in a community and we must foster a
sense of responsibility and commonality among all groups and
individuals.245 Parekh celebrates difference but also recognizes the
importance of a shared community with a robust sense of values and
the common good.2 He promotes a political and legal world that
would recognize both.247 That is a tall order, to say the least.
To make this work, we need to understand the complex interaction
between individuals and the various groups to which they belong.
240. See Ayelet Shachar, Group Identity and Women's Rights in Family Law: The
Perils of Multicultural Accommodation, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 285, 285-91 (1998). Shachar
gives the example of Israeli courts accommodating Rabbinical courts and Halakhic
law. Halakhic law gives husbands the sole right to determine whether or not to
divorce. By accommodating this law in a multicultural fashion, Israel does more than
just accommodate the religious group, it tacitly accepts the domination of women
within that group. See id. at 291.
241. See id. at 288; see also AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS:
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 17 (2001). In addition,
multiculturalism in America produced a kind of intellectual tyranny from the left that
rivaled the consensus patriotism that preceded it on the right. Prone to excess, some
proponents of multiculturalism insisted that only certain forms of scholarship and
certain sorts of statements were valid. They refused to listen to dissent and stifled
conversation by ostracizing anyone whose thoughts strayed from the party line. Of
course, this intolerance is not inherent to the idea of multiculturalism but did seem to
accompany it into public debate.
242. See BHIKHU PAREKH, RETHINKING MULTICULTURALISM: CULTURAL
DIVERSITY AND POLITICAL THEORY 342 (2000).
243. See id. at 341.
244. See id.
245. See id. Parekh advocates a dialogue between cultures and the "ethical norms,
principles and institutional structures presupposed and generated by [those
cultures]." Id. at 14.
246. See id. at 341.
247. See id.
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Charles Taylor, a renowned professor of political philosophy, has
pointed out that identity is not fixed.2 People develop an idea of
self, which is perpetually created and recreated in a symbiotic
relationship with collective identity." Taylor rejects the idea that the
public space ought to be devoid of particularity, characterized only by
republican political culture.250 He dismisses the liberal conception of
a public sphere that erases individual difference." Instead, each
different culture should preserve its authenticity while simultaneously
participating in a public conversation.252 Charles Taylor moves the
debate away from respect for different ethnicities and cultures to the
idea of a nation built on cultural difference.' He argues that over
the course of the last two centuries, nationalism has moved from a
sense of legal rights to ethnic culture.2? In other words, according to
Taylor, we are unified not by geography, political contract, or nation
states, but rather by ethnic ties.
Taylor's work helps to conceptualize the problem, but no one has
quite solved how to balance the concerns over balkanization with the
need to respect difference. This is where professionalism can play a
critical part. As Emile Durkheim argued, the professions have a role
to play in resolving these tensions.2 The professions do hold out the
(still viable) hope of inclusion and participation, as they did for Julius
Henry Cohen." It is not just that education and the professions offer
hope to a bunch of immigrants sitting with their faces pressed up
against the window of privilege. It is also that the legal profession
248. See Charles Taylor, The Politics Of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM AND
"THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION" 25, 31-37 (1992).
249. See id. at 31; see also MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE 150-65 (1982) (articulating a communitarian philosophy based on the notion
that individuals are critically formed by groups like churches, neighborhoods, family,
and unions). Kymlicka agrees that identity is formed by subnational groups, but he
believes that the values of these individuals and groups can be reworked and revised
in dialogue with others. See KYMLICKA, supra note 220, at 92-93.
250. See Taylor, supra note 248, at 37-51.
251. See id.
252. See id. at 31-37.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 28-30.
255. See id. at 56-61.
256. In wrenching professionalism from the clutches of its critics, I am also in some
ways relying on the functionalist analysis that has long gone out of style. See Parker
& Rostain, supra note 11, at 2362. I am obviously not trying to do so in a way that
ignores the important critiques that followed, but rather, acknowledging some limited
but critical worth to the functionalist argument.
257. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
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offers the promise of civic participation, a kind of participation that
allows newcomers not just to belong but also to shape the rules that
constitute the community. Those rules then will reflect not just a
blanched out version of their creators, but rather a complex
professional identity that is created through interaction with all the
groups to which'each individual belongs. This should include racial,
ethnic, religious, civic, gender political, and professional groups, to
name just a few.
In order to capture both cultural specificity and unity, we need an
arena in which the particulars of ethnic and racial identity dissolve
momentarily only to be reconstituted." It is a limited melting pot,
one in which the ingredients reemerge magically after altering the
nature of the mix." The expertise and daily occupation of
professionals provides a common language, a shared goal, of sorts.
The rules of professional ethics and the norms of the courtroom
supply a professional identity. The traditional account of lawyers'
ethics insists that this source of identity should replace all others. In
Sanford Levinson's terms, lawyers must assume a "bleach[ed] out"
professionalism.26 But this account is not only undesirable, it is also
unrealistic. Just as Julius Henry Cohen brought his own particular
circumstances to bear on his work within the profession, so too
inevitably will all professionals. 6' To do so, however, professionals
258. In international law, Ruti Teitel and lavor Rangelov have argued that
resorting to courts to resolve conflict in a world that is increasingly plural is not
necessarily de-politicizing. They suggest that a global civil society can produce an
arena "where legitimacy of justice claims and structures are produced, negotiated,
and contested." Ruti Teitel & Iavor Rangelov, Global Civil Society and Transitional
Justice, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2011: GLOBALITY AND THE ABSENCE OF JUSTICE
162, 176 (Martin Albrow & Hakan Seckinelgin eds., 2010). I am essentially arguing
that the legal profession itself can, and to some degree does, serve a similar purpose
in America.
259. I am not arguing that the legal profession is the only possible source for this
kind of meaningful participation. I agree with Aziz Rana that all sorts of work can
provide the opportunity for this sort of cultural translation. See Rana, supra note 36,
at 1670, 1694-1700.
260. Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the
Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1577, 1577 (1993).
261. At its most extreme, professionalism demands that its members relinquish
their identity, dispense with their sense of morality, and embrace a new professional
persona and a new set of ethical rules in their place. See generally Levinson, supra
note 260. David Wilkins has questioned the wisdom of this understanding of
professionalism. See David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment:
Should a Black Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030,
1041 (1995) [hereinafter Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First Amendment]
(suggesting that race ought to play a role in selecting clients); David Wilkins,
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do have to adopt a professional identity, a miniature version of a
public persona, but the interpretation of professional norms and
values will constantly and invariably be defined by other aspects of
the lawyer's identity. Of course, professionalism does not provide the
entire answer to the dilemma that the need to balance respect for
difference with a sense of unity and common purpose poses. But it
does offer one way to begin to muddle through. As Durkheim
argued, the professions in modem society can offer a bridge.262
Much of the discussion about multiculturalism presumes an
authentic self. It assumes that one's ethnic, racial, gender, or sexual
identity forms that essential being and that everything else is
masquerade.' As a purely descriptive matter, that seems wrong.
Lawyers can belong to more than one world, and it is not simply that
the significance of belonging in an ethnic or racial group shapes their
true self and their public or professional life requires them to blanch
out that difference and assume a false identity to find a common
interest with all.2" As sociologist Erving Goffman argued half a
Straightjacketing Professionalism: A Comment on Russell, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 795, 796
(1997) [hereinafter Wilkins, Straighjacketing Professionalism] (arguing that the
attorneys in the O.J. Simpson Case had obligations both as professionals and as
African Americans). Wilkins argues that black lawyers have responsibilities both as
professionals and as members of their race. They are constantly negotiating these
two axes of their identity. Thus, Wilkins explains:
The legal profession's "mainstream" norms carry moral, not just practical,
weight. They therefore constitute a legitimate constraint on how a black
lawyer should respond to the fact that he or she is both representing race as
well as representing clients.
This does not mean that black lawyers must accept uncritically prevailing
ethical practices. Like other members of the profession, black lawyers have
the right-and indeed the duty-to question the norms of "mainstream
legal practice," and to seek to change these prevailing understandings when
they produce injustice. As I argue elsewhere, African-American attorneys
may have a particularly strong duty to seek change in cases where existing
norms disadvantage the black community.
Wilkins, Straitjacketing Professionalism, supra, at 800. This Article takes Wilkins's
argument one step further perhaps in arguing that race (or the particulars of one's
identity) inevitably plays a role in professional decision-making. While I agree with
Wilkins that this is both necessary and desirable, I am also suggesting that it is one of
the ways in which the profession can and should translate the interests of groups into
a language of expertise, which is accessible to all.
262. See DURKHEIM, supra note 92, at 10-14.
263. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL
RIGHTS 22 (2006).
264. See Levinson, supra note 260, at 1601; Russell Pearce, White Lawyeing:
Rethinking Race, Lawyer Identity, and Rule of Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081,2083
(2005).
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century ago, private life is shaped by the larger community and the
larger community is shaped by ethnic identity.2 6 In other words,
ethnic identity is not authentic and public persona is not artificial.
The individual and group are, as Charles Taylor suggests, constantly
defining one another.'
The exchange, the movement back and forth, is facilitated by
professional groups-groups that bridge the public and the private;
groups that provide a common shared knowledge and expertise.
Through shared language of expertise, professionals translate both
for themselves and for others. At least, it could be like that. Julius
Henry Cohen, for instance, took his own experience as an outsider
and translated it into advocacy for part-time law schools and an
inclusive bar."7 While he was not out fighting for civil rights, he was
working in his daily life to make changes within the mainstream
profession to accommodate and welcome outsiders.2 6 In doing so, he
drew on and subtly changed the rhetoric of the professions.
In his book, Covering: The Hidden Assault on Our Civil Rights,
Yale Professor and legal scholar Kenji Yoshino argues that the world
(including the workplace) requires a sinister form of masquerade.'
It requires that individuals play down qualities that make them
different from others. Drawing on Erving Goffman's book on stigma,
Yoshino claims that like Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who played
down his disability, Americans feel the need to disguise their sexual,
racial, or ethnic identities.270 So, he sums it up, "[w]e are at a
transitional moment in how Americans discriminate.... [I]ndividuals
no longer need to be white, male, straight, Protestant, and able-
bodied; they need only to act white, male, straight, Protestant, and
265. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
(1959). Goffman uses the imagery of a stage, arguing that each person chooses his or
her stage, props, and costume. The goal, it seems, is to maintain coherence, but
coherence is not the same as authenticity. The goal is not to preserve one true
authentic self throughout all interactions but rather to find ways to crossover, to
maintain a coherent but evolving sense of self despite the many different contexts in
which we find ourselves. See id. In a series of articles, Russell Pearce has reflected on
the meaning of professional identity and its intersection with racial, religious, or
ethnic identity. See Pearce, supra note 264, at 2089-99 (arguing that white lawyers
should view themselves as having a racial identity to avoid establishing their own
identity as the norm).
266. See Taylor, supra note 248, at 25, 34.
267. See supra notes 132-75 and accompanying text.
268. See id.
269. See YosHINo, supra note 263, at 22.
270. See id.
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able-bodied."' This, in a way, is the legacy of assimilation.
Americans can invent themselves. All boundaries are permeable.
We can even shed the particularity of our racial, ethnic, or gender
identities to merge into the mainstream. But at what cost?
Without disputing Yoshino's contribution, it is possible to see this
process as less sinister than he makes it out to be. Of course, it would
be bad if individuals were required consistently to repress
characteristics of their sex, race, gender, or sexual orientation. This
demand is neither realistic, nor is it really being made. People always
choose to highlight certain qualities and mute others depending on
the setting. Even white men must blanch out certain personal
characteristics in order to fold themselves into the workplace. The
professions, it seems, provide an opportunity to do so strategically.
Cohen, for instance, seems to have muted his Jewish identity, but
simultaneously translated it into an understanding of what the
profession ought to be.2' He fought for equal access in a way that
gave purpose to that aspect of his identity. And of course, the
profession has changed significantly as those on the periphery have
made their way in.'
CONCLUSION: RELEVANCE OF PROFESSIONALISM AS A ROUTE TO
PARTICIPATION IN A POST-MULTICULTURAL STATE
Of course, we live in a world very different from that of Julius
Henry Cohen. Among other things, the legal market has been
changing at a rapid pace.274 The profession has been highly stratified
271. Id.
272. See Levine, supra note 20, at 3; see also Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the First
Amendment, supra note 261. Wilkins argues that race can and should influence all
sorts of decisions that one makes as a professional. Id. at 1041. For example, in
criticizing the black lawyer for representing the Klu Klux Klan, he argues that
African-American lawyers' experiences as a part of a racial minority ought to inform
and alter the norms of the profession as a whole. See Wilkins, Straightjacketing
Professionalism, supra note 261, at 800.
273. See Eli Wald, The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1803, 1852-54 (2008).
274. See generally William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Law Job
Stagnation May Have Started Before the Recession-and It May Be a Sign of
Lasting Change, A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2011), http://www.abajoumal.com/
magazine/article/paradigm_shift; John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers,
Replaced by Cheaper Software, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/03/05/science/05legal.html; Aric Press, A Chasm With Consequences, AM. LAW.
(June 1, 2011), http://www.amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/06/chasm.html;
Joel Stashenko, Lawyers Face New Challenges from Global Competition, N.Y. L.J.,
Feb. 4,2011.
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ever since Cohen was an active member of the bar.275 The diverse
nature of the bar has always existed in an odd tension with the idea of
a unified profession. For years, the proliferation of different sorts of
legal work and areas of expertise has posed a challenge to the ideal of
a unified profession.276 Technology and globalization now threaten to
render the concept obsolete.' The opportunities in the law seem to
be shutting down rather than expanding.278 Amidst these challenges,
many call for the segmentation of law schools to track the growingly
distinct realms of legal practice."' Scholars like Brian Tamanaha
suggest that the top ten law schools ought to continue as they are,
teaching theory to an elite group who will use their grasp of
jurisprudence to shape the laws of the country by practicing in
prestigious law firms or government jobs? All the others, who study
law at inferior institutions, ought be trained to serve individual clients
and practice a trade.21 This education will be faster, cheaper, and
more relevant. Certainly, the argument goes, there is no place for
theory, classes on jurisprudence, or the antiquated Socratic method at
these lower ranked schools.
Recently, legal scholar and sociologist Elizabeth Chambliss has
criticized this call for the segmentation of law schools, arguing that it
assumes that corporate clients need lawyers educated in history,
theory, and philosophy, while average individual clients do not.m It
assumes that representing individuals is simple and requires relatively
little understanding of how the law develops and changes. It assumes
that we should funnel all the best-credentialed students to corporate
practice. It assumes that corporate clients do not need lawyers with
skills in counseling and human interaction. All of these assumptions
are unproved, if not patently false.
While it would be silly to swim against the tide and resist changes
in the legal profession that are inevitable products of a growingly
275. See Wald, supra note 273, at 1824.
276. See ABEL, supra note 41, at 9; Wilkins, supra note 18, at 1152-54.
277. See Elizabeth Charnbliss, Imphcations of Strategic Allhances with US. Law
Schools, FORDHAM L. REv. (forthcoming); Markoff, supra note 274; Stashenko, supra
note 274.
278. See Richard A. Matasar, The Viability of the Law Degree: Cost, Value, and
Intrinsic Worth, 96 IOWA L. REv. 1579, 1621-25 (2011); TAMANAHA, supra note 15,
at 167-71.
279. See id. at 172-76.
280. See id. at 174.
281. See id.
282. See Chambliss, supra note 277.
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global market, it is also unwise to embrace all the changes without
contemplating what, if any, aspects of the profession are worth trying
to preserve. This Article offers one caution. The idea of a unified
legal profession and the rhetoric that accompanies it is useful. It has,
among other things, served those on the periphery as a narrative of
success. It has provided a story not just about financial gain but about
movement from the irrelevant outskirts of an alien nation to the
center, in which the newcomer (or her children) may shape the rules
and values of the world in which she lives.
Even before the nation felt the full extent of the 2008 financial
collapse, some scholars suggested that this version of the American
Dream is dying. In an article in the literary and political magazine
N+1, law professor and political theorist Aziz Rana argued that
President Obama could not attract a popular following because his
message of success through hard work, merit, and professional
education is no longer accessible to most.' In his campaign, Obama
claimed (much like I have argued here) that his position as an
outsider, as the child of a racially mixed marriage who made his way
in through professional success, situated him perfectly to fight for
equal opportunity.' Obama's message, quite similar to that of Julius
Henry Cohen, rang hollow. The American public viewed him as
elitist and, ironically, his opponent John McCain-a child of
privilege-as a man of the people? This, Rana argued, is because
the professional version of the American Dream is inherently elitist.'
It assumes that only a precious few will rise up through its ranks.
In this way, Julius Henry Cohen is, perhaps, a relic. Perhaps his
use of professionalism is antiquated like most of the others.
However, it is precisely the blend of elitism and equality in the
professional ideal that makes it relevant and worth salvaging. It is the
exclusivity that offers the real promise of success. Of course, if the
predictions are correct and access to the good life through
professional advancement is really ossified then the promise is empty.
But, this is, at least in part, a self-fulfilling prophecy. If we abandon
the rhetoric of professionalism and allow it to fall by the wayside
along with the other versions of the American Dream, we are
essentially capitulating. The ideal gives individuals and the
283. See Aziz Rana, Obama and the Closing of the American Dream, N+1 (Sept.
8,2008), http://www.nplusonemag.com/obama.
284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id.
2012] 73
FORDHAM URB. L.J
community as a whole something to strive for and demand. As long
as that is not completely futile, then it is worthwhile to maintain the
legal profession's promise and try to make good on it.
Of course, there are concerns along the way. If the myth of a
unified profession persists, if the frontier has not yet disappeared
completely, then regulators need to be careful that they do not carry
the ideal beyond its useful limits. Professionalism can serve the useful
purpose this Article has identified without serving the pernicious
purposes that others have correctly noted before me. There is no
reason, after all, why all lawyers practicing in different areas need to
be governed by the same ethical rules.' There is no reason why the
rhetoric of the professions needs to dictate severe entry requirements
and outdated rules against competition. There is no reason why the
notion of a profession, with a singular role in finding and promoting a
common good in society, needs to support rules restricting
multidisciplinary practice or barring innovative ways to finance
litigation. In other words, the rhetoric of the professions has been
used to justify a lot of unnecessary monopolistic conduct. It has been
used to resist change and hold onto outmoded ways of practice. The
rhetoric can be divorced from these side effects and used to further its
more constructive purpose.
287. See Wilkins, supra note 18, at 1216-17.
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